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Jean-Antoine Le Vachet’s exemplary life of the shoemaker, Henry Buch, 
is not only revealing of a dévot social program aimed at limiting or 
eliminating promiscuity among artisans, it is also suggestive of just how 
elites’ “projections” of social roles onto their inferiors may function as hagi-
ographic exemplarity. D. Ribaud asserts that Buch wished to repress com-
pagnonnage (p. 233), but she then quotes the source, which says that he 
wished to “renverser les impiétés du compagnonnage,” a quite different 
aim. Buch’s most striking activity would seem to have been giving the 
handicapped and the untrained a chance by offering them work. Does 
Nicolas Delamare’s Traité de la Police, or his manuscripts at the B.N.F., give 
more information about what presumably was a dévot, and later on, about 
governmental programs to reform the shoemakers? 
There has recently been much new research on exemplarity – for 
example, C. Huchard, D’Encre et de Sang: Simon Goulart et la Saint-Barthélemy 
(Paris: Champion, 2007); but nowhere else has this reviewer read a study of 
it with the approach on which all such studies ought to begin, namely, the 
history of philosophy. M.-P. Gaviano’s study of Dupleix on exemplarity is 
just that, exemplary! 
Orest Ranum 
Béatrice Guion : Du bon usage de l’Histoire. Histoire, morale et politique 
à l’âge classique. Paris : Champion, 2008. 631 p. 
By beginning with what would seem to be a consensus – grounded on 
pioneering studies by philosophers and, more recently, by historians – that 
history stagnated in the seventeenth century, or perhaps regressed from 
what it had been in the sixteenth, Béatrice Guion frames her study in order 
to confirm or nuance this conclusion. What happened between the great 
generation led by Baudouin, Bodin, La Popelinière, and Pasquier, and the 
generation led by Mabillon, Leclerc, and Bayle? After exploring all the 
programmatic sources, and after personal reflection, she works through all 
the possible conditions, except the later rhetorical and political, that might 
have affected historical writing; and stating clearly the facts, she lets the 
reader draw the conclusions. The readings and themes are so complex and 
extensive that summarizing them here would be too lengthy. The following 
little essay raises her main points and occasionally offers, with great 
respect, other readings. 
How to characterize the sources that B. Guion reads in order to explore 
early-modern, primarily French, historical thought? Beginning in the late 
fifteenth century, Humanists developed something similar to a genre, 
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without a specific name, for exploring, commenting on, and philosophizing 
on virtually all aspects of intellectual inquiry. Often bearing provocative 
titles such as On the Dignity of Man, or Discourse on the Little Certainty in 
History, translations of ancient texts and commentaries on them became the 
foundation not only for criticism but for modern disciplines. Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus would be considered the first critic of history, when he wrote 
about it but did not write it. Guion uses the tag ars historica to delineate her 
sources, but to develop her analysis, she does not hesitate to use what histo-
rians wrote about in their histories, thereby complementing her emphasis 
on the art-of-history genre. She also makes forays into the mirror-of-princes 
genre, and into pedagogical treatises on occasion. 
Recent research by historians of science, literature, and rhetoric (A. 
Blair, F. Goyet, and A. Moss) have elucidated the fundamentally Aristotelian 
approaches developed in these Humanists’ writings. Reliance on common-
places remains pervasive, because Aristotle argues that only general truth 
can be known, not the particular. His ethical dialectics also pervade these 
works, e.g., whether history is useful or not, or whether it should please or 
instruct, and so forth. In some instances, the works on history and poetry 
have very similar modes of thought: to appreciate the artes historicae they 
must therefore be read with an understanding of what their authors in-
tended. In stating this, the reviewer recognizes his own shortcomings when 
he proposed readings of some of these texts in Artisans of Glory (1980). 
The analysis (I am avoiding the term “critical”) of sources developed by 
the juridical historians and La Popelinière, for example, is not explored by 
B. Guion; thus it is not possible to compare his critical understanding with 
Bayle’s. Père Daniels’s pyrrhonist critiques of sources and state secrecy 
differ little from La Popelinière’s, for example in the Introduction to his 
History of the Admiralty. The topical structure of Guion’s book is complex 
and filled with concepts that do not seem to change their meaning, though 
their contexts do. There are numerous discussions of Prudence, the Provi-
dential, and exemplarity, but no general analysis of their change or con-
tinuity is proposed. When she confronts an element of the ars rhetorica that 
is not part of her discussion in the beginning section, she recognizes it for 
what it is, and hurries on. The result is, in many respects, an illuminating 
analysis about history’s [sic] attempt to free itself from ancient rhetoric; but 
of course, as historical thought evolved, so did rhetoric. 
Other disciplinary frames would enable historians to keep rhetoric at a 
distance, namely Legal Humanism, perhaps Skepticism, and certainly Mille-
narianism (C.G. Dubois) in the sixteenth century. Lorenzo Valla’s critical 
perspective on texts would inspire Gallicans to deepen knowledge of the 
Early Church. Similarly, Budé’s De Asse (known for its mediocre Latin, read: 
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not conforming to the latest rules of grammar and rhetoric), and Cujas’s 
editions of and commentary on Roman law, would establish a very strong 
critical attitude toward historical sources and their interpretation. It would 
inspire Bayle, Le Clerc, Fauchet, the Duchesnes, the Godefroys, the Dupuys, 
the Sainte-Marthes, and others such as Lacurne de Saint-Palaye. B. Guion 
quotes Mabillon: “plusieurs habiles gens depuis cent ans se sont occupé [sic] 
à éclaircir l’histoire” (p. 10). Mabillon thus sees no break or decline 
between the work of the critical historians of the sixteenth century and his 
own. If we can trust Mabillon, and I believe we should, the notion of decline 
of historical thought in the seventeenth century ought to be rejected. 
Similarly, efforts to discern skeptical and moral philosophical influences 
such as Augustinianism on learned historical scholarship, though worth ex-
ploring, may not be convincing. Rapin, in his Instructions... (1677), a model 
Aristotelian programmatic statement if ever there was one, finds himself in 
dialogue with Strada on questions about just how much historians can 
know, still another mark of continuity. Guion finds that at least Bayle read 
skeptical works, if only to reject their views about history, and Mabillon’s 
comment on ethical questions raised by Saint-Réal confirms the oft-stated 
finding that within each and every tendency or approach, there would 
occasional be exchanges and influences among them. There may have been 
points of influence within the different sub-genres of history, but the 
influence on actual historical writing of the humanist philosophical currents 
of Skepticism and Libertinism remains to be confirmed. 
Another very important strain from the sixteenth century would be the 
Machiavellian-Guicciardinian-even-Tacitean. The Prince is in the mirror-of-
princes genre, and it would first be read along with Tacitus’s Annals to 
create a perspective that seemed dangerous to many moralists, because ne-
gative exempla and arguments on behalf of dissimulation were included. 
Religion was just another instrument for manipulating subjects. This per-
spective contributed to Pibrac’s and Naudé’s justification of the St. Bartholo-
mew’s Day Massacres, and formed the approach for collecting common-
places about the use of power (arcana imperii). The coup d’État would be 
celebrated by Naudé, but P. Stacey suggests that the Prince ought to be read 
as ironic, and S. Gouverneur has found little influence by Naudé on histor-
ical thought; so it would seem that this vein of thought would nourish polit-
ical theory rather than history. 
Naudé’s writing on coups d’État, the Machiavelli of the Discourses, 
Guicciardini, and a classical-republican or senatorial view of Tacitus’s 
Annals and On Germany, would be refracted not only in Lipsius but also, no 
doubt, in Bodin. La Popelinière, and de Thou. After seeming to lack 
representation except in Frondeur memoirs, Amelot de la Houssaye’s 
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“translation” of Machiavelli as a Tacitean would go on to inspire much 
Enlightenment historical thought modeled on the Histoire de la République de 
Venise. A thread of doubt about the value of exemplarity runs through this 
approach to history. 
The skeptical critique of historical thought inspired by the publications 
of Sextus Empiricus and developed by Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe 
Le Vayer, has been studied by L. Bianchi and L. De Nardis. Guion essentially 
adopts their conclusions without offering her own readings of La Mothe Le 
Vayer’s Discours du peu de certitude de l’Histoire, which despite its title is a 
quite conventional work in the Humanist tradition of the ars historica. The 
continuators of this ars-historica perspective (discussed above) certainly took 
La Mothe’s work seriously, as they reordered their commonplaces to take 
mild skepticism into account; but Rapin would seem to ignore it or 
downplay it, as he restates what had been started at least a century earlier 
by Patrizzi, le Roy, and Mascardi. On occasion, the heirs of Cujas and 
Fauchet would express regret about the lack of eloquence in their learned 
prose; but the skeptical critique was never, to my knowledge, engaged, 
except to be rejected. 
The Augustinian moral and religious currents that developed not only 
around Port-Royal but elsewhere, after mid-century, prompted questions 
about just how heroic such figures as Alexander the Great and Scipio 
Africanus really were, a critique that did not undermine the panegyric 
(Louis XIV) just as the latter genre virtually cuts its moorings from history. 
If Balzac had made the ancient Romans into salonniers, Augustinianism saw 
brutality and violence beneath virtu. The Stoic celebration of austerity and 
even poverty (one thinks of Poussin’s Eudamides) came in for questions 
from an Epicurean perspective. B. Guion is right to note that Saint-
Evremond did not rank among the learned critical historians, but his 
critique of earlier images of Romans as well as his Plutarchian parallels of 
great men of his own time (Condé) and in Antiquity, prompted reflection 
and criticism of the very simplified image of the heroic derived from 
authors such as Quintus Curtius. Sorting out the currents that influenced 
Saint-Evremond is beyond the ambition of this reviewer, but it would seem 
that Epicurean thought, with its acceptance of living well, played more of a 
part than the Augustinian, which was austere and even ascetic. Hobbes may 
be brought to bear here, perhaps, but not particularly strongly in this 
quotation (p. 500), since it is a paraphrase from Book I of Machiavelli’s 
Discourses. It may well be antique, with Livy obviously the first place to 
look. Balzac and Saint-Evremond jumped the traces of the ars historica by 
writing history, as Bayle would, not just writing about historians and their 
works. 
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There are judicious explorations of the commonplaces about the 
usefulness of history and politics, Providentialism, exemplarity, and public 
and secret history; but the most original and illuminating is about the 
general effects of the Augustinian moral and, to use jargon, psychological 
climate on programmatic historical thought after the Fronde. The debates 
about the use of negative examples became intense (again!). Since at least 
Erasmus, this question depended on one’s views of human nature and the 
individual’s capacity to discern right from wrong. 
T. Hampton’s and J. Lyons’s works on exemplarity are cited, but the 
argument about the decline of exemplarity is not really addressed. Saint-
Evremond is, it would seem, ambivalent on this, since his parallels of the 
great cast doubt on greatness, while still measuring it. Guion’s discussions of 
Plutarch turn on his use of the mirror metaphor, and prudence, but it is not 
evident that Plutarch’s construction of portraits through moral language was 
strengthened or weakened by the restatement of human failings drawn from 
the author of the Confessions. B. Guion’s overly complicated topical struc-
ture makes it almost impossible to grasp an overall or general assessment of 
any single historian’s thought. For example, reading in all the various places 
where Bodin is discussed would not yield a general view, because the 
various contexts are stated so strongly as to make this impossible. 
As previously noted, rhetoric seems static; yet through his discernment 
of Asianism and Atticism, M. Fumaroli found not only a deepening of 
historical understanding of rhetoric, but also a synthesis in a new canon of 
rules that would come to be known as classicism. Bossuet’s Discours sur 
l’Histoire universelle is, in its rhetoric, a “new” history. 
An almost celebratory tone develops in the chapters on the critical histo-
rians, notably Le Clerc and Bayle; Saint-Evremond and Fontanelle are also 
lifted into this Pantheon; it is unclear whether Père Daniel, the Jesuit, is. 
Criticism, modernity, secularization, and continuity are terms charged with 
different meanings in different contexts. Guion’s caution is to be 
commended, but tentativeness in characterizing the programmatic in history 
leaves the reader in doubt, not a skeptical doubt, just a plain old common-
sense doubt about whether critical historical thought in the late seventeenth 
century marked a more modern development as a result of skeptical, 
Augustinian, and Epicurean currents that were influential after 1650, or was 
a continuity from the world of Bodin, La Popelinière, and Pasquier. 
There are words with stable semantic fields since ancient Roman times, 
and example-exemplum is one of them. Contexts inevitably render meanings 
more or less complex, sometimes more vague, sometimes more precise, but 
in translation exemple is still usually translated as “example.” When Cicero 
refers to an example in a law case to firm up an argument by history, the 
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reason for using the example is evident. In St. Jerome, when Jesus talks to 
his disciples about washing feet: “Exemplum enim dedi vobis” (John 13:15), 
the term is obviously entirely free from its earlier judicial contexts. In 
Béatrice Guion’s discussions of exemplarity, she quite rightly relies on this 
trans-historical meaning. When Montaigne and Pascal offer critiques of 
exemplarity, they also rely on this stable signification. 
Orest Ranum 
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Most studies on corporeality in the seventeenth century focus on the radical 
difference of psyche and soma while accepting the hierarchization of the 
substances, with references to Descartes and Jansenist moralists. The history 
of science in early modern Europe has recently become a field of new 
theoretical approaches that seek to correct these hierarchical binaries and to 
rectify the flawed assessment of the inferior role of the body, the passions, 
and sensations in the Cartesian era. Erec R. Koch’s innovative study argues 
persuasively that the body is far from being secondary, alienated, or purely 
mechanical within seventeenth-century thought. By drawing on sources 
from the late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century, the author 
explores the way in which corporeal sensibilities gave rise to a subject-body 
that announced in a remarkable way the discoveries of corporal sensibilities 
by eighteenth-century thinkers. Founding his analysis on a vast array of 
sources (philosophical thought, metaphysical writings, theories on the 
cosmos, political theory, and moralistic thought), in each chapter Koch 
turns to one particular sense and its relation to passion-production.  
Koch’s connected arguments are that for seventeenth-century thinkers, 
“the body becomes the source and site of passion and sensation, which the 
mind receives” (14), that “sensibility and passion are the products of forces 
of a universe of plenitude and matter in motion, which act on the body” 
(13), and that these two developments converge into an aesthetic body. 
Chapter one describes the physiological underpinning of corporeal sensi-
bility through an in-depth analysis of its history in both the sixteenth 
century and the seventeenth century, culminating in Descartes’s late treatise 
Les Passions de l’âme. After a brief and pertinent review of Ancient Greek 
thought on the organic unity between the physical and the spiritual, as well 
as anatomical discoveries in the Renaissance, the chapter gives full attention 
to Descartes’s treatises and correspondences. Koch highlights the impor-
